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President Cheney and his influence in
the Bush administration during the Six
Party Talks. “The neoconservatives,
aided by a vice president’s office deep
with suspicions of the Foreign Service,
seem to believe that the State Department negotiated with the North Koreans
because we enjoyed it. Our effort to explain . . . fell on deaf ears.” Despite Hill’s
best efforts, the North Koreans decided
not to comply with American demands,
and he was soon brought back home.
After a short respite, Hill was selected
to replace Ambassador Ryan Crocker
in Iraq. He makes many valuable
observations about his tour in Iraq,
especially his strained relations with
the U.S. military leadership responsible
for the region, in particular Generals
David Petraeus and Ray Odierno. His
criticism is also directed at the Obama
administration, which he perceived as
slow “to grasp the complexities of the
region, the seeming confusion within
its foreign policy team between wars
of democracy and sectarian enmity.”
Outpost: Life on the Frontlines of American Diplomacy is a significant contribution to the international studies field and
is a must-read. This volume will appeal
to anyone who is interested in learning
more about the Department of State or
the intricacies of American interagency
relationships. However, with all the
security challenges facing the United
States in the foreseeable future, this
book also needs to be read by midgrade
and senior military professionals so
they may gain a better appreciation of
the Foreign Service and the people who
serve in that important institution.
T. J. JOHNSON
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Friedberg, Aaron L. Beyond Air-Sea Battle: The
Debate over US Military Strategy in Asia. London:
Routledge, 2014. 152pp. $14.99

Normally, a recommendation regarding
for which audience a book is best suited
comes at the end of the review. In this
case, it comes first because Professor
Aaron Friedberg provides a tight monograph that illuminates areas of great
misunderstanding to a large population
in the policy and defense communities:
the debate over the concept of Air-Sea
Battle (ASB) and the vernacular of modern maritime strategy. Landlubbers who
have been engrossed for the last fourteen
years in land wars in South Asia should
read this book. As a history professor teaching a population composed
predominantly of U.S. Army majors
at the Command and General Staff
College in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,
this reviewer has firsthand experience
of this shortfall in knowledge in both
uniformed and civilian defense personnel. The book is also recommended
to all those who desire a comprehensive discussion of the concept and its
variations, alternatives, and origins.
Friedberg, a professor of politics and
international relations at Prince
ton University, made a compelling
case in a January 2015 Washington
Quarterly article about the People’s
Republic of China’s (PRC’s) “new assertiveness,” which, he argues in this
book, is the primary motivator for the
emergence of ASB. From this and his
other writings, he clearly believes that a
response to this assertiveness is absolutely necessary, if not overdue, and in
need of high-profile public debate.
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The monograph is organized into an introduction, four thematic chapters, and
a concluding chapter, all in about 150
pages of nicely spaced text—making it a
comparatively short read, although not a
simple one. Friedberg first lays out how
ASB came to be and how the concept is
defined. Like everyone else, he traces the
origins of ASB to the challenge presented by the PRC’s adoption of a maritime
strategy that includes antiaccess/areadenial (A2/AD), although when ASB
emerged it was generically framed and
could have referred to other countries, including Iran (see for example
this reviewer’s “Air-Sea Battle and
Its Discontents,” USNI Proceedings,
October 2013). A2/AD involved the
expansion of the capabilities of the
People’s Liberation Army Navy after
the Taiwan crisis of 1996 to deny use
of the maritime commons inside the
so-called first island chain and to challenge approaches to that area (p. 26).
Geographically, the first island chain
extends from the Japanese archipelago,
through Taiwan and the Philippines, to
the exit of the South China Sea (SCS)
at the Malacca Strait near Singapore.
China began increasing its surface
and subsurface fleets and its ability to
project air power from land bases into
this region, as well as using innovative
new weapons such as antiship ballistic
missiles to threaten U.S. high-value
units such as aircraft carriers, amphibious assault ships, and logistics vessels
beyond the first island chain. Additionally, as A2/AD developed it came to
represent a “credible threat,” according to Friedberg, to the naval and air
bases and logistics support by U.S. allies
along the first island chain (pp. 27–28).
Friedberg describes this all in detail
in the introduction and first chapter.
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His second chapter then argues that
the United States responded belatedly to A2/AD because of the terrorist
attacks of 9/11 and the 2008 financial
crisis and great recession. The former
distracted U.S. policy makers from the
emerging threat, and the latter prevented a strong response, because of
the perceived costs in a dismal fiscal
environment. Evidently he believes the
current fiscal environment has eased
enough to take the challenge more
seriously. Here Friedberg could have
supported his argument by emphasizing that, in addition to the economic
crisis at home, the two wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan were consuming inordinate
U.S. resources in 2008. Nonetheless, he
does a credible job of debunking those
critics of ASB who say the A2/AD threat
is overstated or that the relationship
between the United States and China has
improved enough to obviate a response.
Friedberg then outlines in chapter 3
what can be called the classical ASB concept, calling it the “direct approach.” This
approach is primarily offensive, although
it does not posit a U.S. “first strike” but
rather a reactive counteroffensive that
threatens the PRC’s land-based power
projection and naval support to A2/AD
with commensurate U.S. naval and air
power, preferably in concert with allies
such as Japan. He addresses critics by
examining ASB’s efficacy in the following areas (using speculative analysis
in some cases): military outcomes,
political outcomes, escalation (including
nuclear), deterrence value, reassurance
to allies, and the effects on competition
between the United States and the PRC.
Friedberg’s inclusion of nuclear escalatory calculus is a welcome component,
given how little this topic seems to
be factored into policy discussions in
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the multipolar nuclear world we now
inhabit. The Department of Defense
has an Air-Sea Battle Office, as does
the U.S. Navy, and his discussion at the
end of chapter 3 is aimed, presumably,
at the folks inhabiting those organizations and their strategic masters.
Friedberg forecasts two potential ASB
approaches: a “linear” approach that
uses existing resources and technology and, in contrast, a “discontinuous”
approach that relies heavily on new
technologies and un-fielded weapons
concepts (pp. 95–98). Friedberg seems
to prefer the linear approach, given the
ease with which it can be implemented
(although that ease does not mean it
will be inexpensive), but he does not
rule out investigating new technologies. He is obviously wary of “betting
the farm” on a “futures” approach.
In his final chapter, Friedberg describes
two indirect approaches or “alternatives”
to ASB: either a distant blockade or
what he calls “maritime denial” (pp. 104,
116–17). He again applies an analytic
framework to assess the efficacy of these
less-offensive-oriented approaches. Distant blockade is merely economic warfare. It would aim at Chinese shipping,
principally oil tankers at the key straits’
entrances leading through the SCS to
Chinese ports. Maritime denial is simply
ASB limited primarily to the global commons and PRC littoral inside the first island chain. One might characterize maritime denial as an active defense of the
global commons, but again it is reactive,
not something to implement without
significant Chinese military provocation.
The conclusion reviews the bidding on
everything discussed. Here Friedberg
comes across as a bit more bellicose than
one might expect, implying that a mix
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of all three approaches—ASB, distant
blockade, and maritime denial—would
probably be the best course of action.
Friedberg comes closest to the nub of
the issue when he writes: “The first
dividing line in the debate over this issue
is between the advocates of maritime
denial, who seek to avoid strikes against
targets on the Chinese mainland, and
the proponents of ASB, who believe
that war cannot be won without such
attacks” (p. 137). However, he leaves
the door open for the reader to make
up his or her own mind on the issue.
While this might be perceived as
strength, it is also something of a disappointment, because this reviewer wanted
to know what Friedberg really recommends. Friedberg is clearly not of the
opinion that ASB should be dismissed,
and seems to support a course of action
that implies the direct approach option
while being ready, at a moment’s notice,
to implement the other two approaches
in response to a PRC “first strike” (p. 37).
Friedberg leverages all the latest writing
on the topic, using the work of writers familiar to naval audiences such as
Jan van Tol and Wayne Hughes. He has
done his homework, and now it is time
for all others to do theirs as the United
States faces the A2/AD challenge.
JOHN T. KUEHN

Preble, Christopher, and John Mueller, eds. A
Dangerous World? Threat Perception and U.S. National Security. Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute,
2014. 224pp. $12.95

Medical doctors are trained to recognize when patients’ complaints and
self-diagnoses need to be ignored, lest
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